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Virtues for Peace: What Soldiers Can Do and Where Military Robotics Fails

Bernhard Koch

The distancing of human beings from the battlefields of war through remote-controlled and fully automated weaponry has rekindled the debate on the value and significance of military virtues. Why do some ethicists—this author among them—believe that, from a moral perspective, as human soldiers retreat from armed conflict, a gap has emerged, which the most highly developed technologies cannot fill? To approach an answer to this question, the following will offer some—but in no way exhaustive—reflections that are based on a traditional concept of virtue (not the only one) and a concept of “positive” peace, which is more than the absence of violence but rather a communicative situation of mutual willingness to recognize others as moral beings and mutual benevolence. Positive peace comes in grades and is never fully attained. “Negative” peace (e.g., absence of violence) is a precondition for it. I will furthermore attempt to develop some reference points and conclusions for dealing with the military practices created by new technological possibilities. In this process, it should

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become clear that “inner” attitudes, values, and virtues\(^1\) matter, because they are seldom purely internal, but for a morally sensitive person are externally perceptible.\(^2\) Please confirm if the inserted city name is correct. Amend if necessary. I hold two positions: Deputy Director of the Institute for Theology and Peace Hamburg and Visiting Lecturer at the Goethe-University Frankfurt. Frankfurt is correct.

1. To be sure, many texts have recently spoken of virtue ethics or the necessity of virtue, but the concept of virtue often shimmers in various nuances.\(^3\) The hope placed in the (ethics of) virtue feeds above all on the aporiae into which deontological and teleological approaches seem to have fallen.\(^4\) Virtues ethics then appears on the horizon as a promising third way that could lead out of the normative dilemma. Aristotle’s moral philosophy—especially his Nicomachean Ethics—still gives the most illuminating answer to the meaning of the concept of virtue and shows that virtue is not beyond deontological and teleological reasoning.

Aristotle’s concept of virtue can only be reconstructed on the basis of his moral psychology. With regard to the soul, he distinguishes between a rational and a non-rational (a-rational, not irrational) part of the soul. The non-rational part of the soul includes the vegetative parts, such as the causes of nourishment and growth. Their virtues take place without organized action—for example, in sleep.\(^5\) They are not relevant to ethics. Another part of this portion of the soul, while separate from reason, is connected with reason through its struggle with it (“clashing and struggling”\(^6\)). But because, in a controlled person, this portion permits itself to be governed by reason, it seems to partake in reason. In the rational portion of the soul, a distinction is therefore possible between reason as such and the appetitive faculty (apetitikon) that can follow reason. “The virtue of the rational portion of the soul we call dianoetic virtue ... the virtue of the appetitive is ethical virtue, that is, virtue of character.”\(^7\)

Virtue, then, is of two sorts, virtue of thought and virtue of character. Virtue of thought arises and grows mostly from teaching; that is why it needs experience and time. Virtue of character (i.e., of ethos) results from habit (ethos).\(^8\)

Virtues of character are thus practiced and need practice to be developed and sustained. Virtues are not affects, for they are not based on decisions. Ethical virtues are attitudes (hexes), specifically those “on the basis of which we act correctly towards the affects.”\(^9\)

In the interpretation of virtue that I try to apply here, it is practical judgment (phronesis), not the virtues, that tells us about the morally required action.\(^10\) Simply relying on virtues is thus not enough to help us escape actual or apparent normative dilemmas. Hercules at the crossroads is not helped with an imperative of the “Be brave!” or “Be prudent!” type. He needs criteria for deciding which road to take. These criteria are communicable and can be discussed in an inter-subjective way. When the left road proves to be the better one, but Hercules is afraid to take it, his ethical virtue is shown in the attitude he takes towards his fear.

Thus virtues ensure that people can first of all make careful deliberations (for the dianoetic virtues), and second of all actually act on those thoughts (ethical virtues). Cicero’s De officiis—which is based on the middle-Stoic account of Panaitios, which in turn is indebted to Peripatetic thinking—says,

Since, therefore, there can be no doubt on this point, that man is the source of both the greatest help and the greatest harm to man, I set it down as the peculiar function of virtue to win the hearts of men and to attach them to one’s own service.\(^11\)

Virtue links the heart with correct actions. In this sense, virtues are quite central to the motivation for correct behavior.\(^12\)

2. We have already said that virtues of character require practice. The task of politics, according to Aristotle, is to create laws in such a way that virtuous practice is the result. But we must also address other important aspects of his political philosophy. The following reflections are based on ideas from the early conception of the ideal state in Book 7 of Politics.\(^13\) Like Plato, Aristotle parallels the situations of individual human beings and the polis.
Life as a whole is divided into business and leisure, and war and peace, and our actions are aimed some of them at things necessary and useful, others at things noble.\textsuperscript{14}

The life of an individual human being is devoted to either business or leisure, while the “life” of the state is devoted to either war or peace. But business and leisure, war and peace, are not of equal value: the purpose of the less-good is the better.

War must be for the sake of peace, business for the sake of leisure, things necessary and useful for the purpose of things noble.\textsuperscript{15}

Just as we work to create the necessary goods for leisure, the polis sometimes makes war in order to restore peace. War is not an end in itself, just as work is not an end in itself. The virtues practiced and carried out in war are only morally valuable if they are maintained in peacetime as well. The state form of the Lacedaemonians provides a telling example of a political community that focused entirely on war-making, and thus neglected the proper telos of a polis. War cannot be a stable condition. A polis focused on war falls to ruin once war ceases (1334a). The lawmakers in such a city have failed to train people for leisure, or for peace.\textsuperscript{16}

Aristotle’s realism takes it as a given that a polis will always need to deal with external enemies. If it wishes to survive, it must be prepared to defend itself. The exercise of virtue in the process can be valuable for peace:

Courage and fortitude are needed for business, love of wisdom for leisure, temperance and justice for both seasons, and more especially when men are at peace and have leisure, for war compels men to be just and temperate, whereas the enjoyment of prosperity and peaceful leisure tend to make them insolent.\textsuperscript{17}

War reduces the resources of a polis. Thus it essentially demands, from the outside, limitations on the actors that virtue alone must ensure in peacetime. For Aristotle, a life that urges constant expansion has missed its purpose. This is true both for the life of the individual, who sacrifices her or his self-sufficiency, and for the political life of a city, which loses its telos. But it would nevertheless be absurd to refrain from the use of artificial aids in order to practice virtue; this is shown by an example that can mutatis mutandis be applied to our current challenges, which involve the ways in which we may wage armed conflicts:

Aristotle tells of those in the public discourse who offered the opinion that cities should, ideally, refrain from building fortifications, for without this artificial means of keeping the opponent in check, the necessary wartime virtues could be better practiced and carried out:

As regards walls, those who aver that cities which pretend to valour should not have them hold too old-fashioned a view—and that though they see that the cities that indulge in that form of vanity are refuted by experience. It is true that against an evenly matched foe and one little superior in numbers it is not honourable to try to secure oneself by the strength of one’s fortifications; but as it may possibly happen that the superior numbers of the attackers may be too much for the human valour of a small force, if the city is to survive and not to suffer disaster or insult, the securest fortification of walls must be deemed to be the most warlike, particularly in view of the inventions that have now been made in the direction of precision with missiles and artillery for sieges.\textsuperscript{18}

Using this example, Aristotle shows that it is pointless to artificially refrain from taking possible security measures in order to give the formation of virtue a boost. Purposely refusing to use available technologies, in order to exhibit one’s talents under the harsh conditions thus intentionally created, is hardly itself virtuous, for it neglects the importance of rational moral judgment. After all, the opponent also benefits from technological progress. Whether it is right to surround a city with walls or not is a question that must be determined by prudence, taking account of general criteria of ethical behavior. The correct answer is not found by making reality an artificial playground in which to practice virtue.

3. The relationship between virtuous and technology thus occupied the philosophy of antiquity in quite similar fashion as it does us today, when we discuss, for example, the use of armed drones and other
military robotics. When in the following we consider urgent ethical questions involving new developments in military technology, we will see that, as with Aristotle’s example of city walls, one of the problems with technological innovation is the attitudes and values accompanying its use. In developing the commonalities between the questions that plagued Aristotle and our own, but also in establishing ethically relevant distinctions (without claiming to do this with any completeness), it will hopefully become clear that one fundamental feature of our moral consciousness—consciousness as awareness of moral facts—expressed with the word “virtue,” remains relevant.

4. Advocates of armed drones are to a certain extent correct when they argue that we cannot simply abandon unmanned aerial combat vehicles (UACVs) because combat would be more chivalrous or virtuous without them. Given my definition of virtues, we cannot claim that not using armed drones would be better for virtue’s sake as long as we do not know whether the use of armed drones is right. If it is right (or even necessary) to use armed drones, not using them would not be virtuous and would not promote virtue. But if it is wrong to use drones, then while it may not be virtuous to use them, the reason it is wrong to use them is not because of this fact, but rather because of the fact that it is wrong to use them. It is irrelevant which virtue we wish to focus on in particular, be it bravery or some notion of “chivalry” as a virtue.

Is it right to use military robotics, and if so, how? The answer depends to some extent on an overarching horizon of reflection. The horizon determines which arguments are even taken into account and can gain acceptance. In the following I shall argue that we must indeed, first of all, expand our horizons beyond an oversimplified consequentialist model of moral thinking, and second, a moral anthropology that takes the theory of virtue seriously can prove successful in this expanded model.

5. Frequently, advocates of armed drones argue that providing armed forces with armed drones enhances the protection of their own soldiers (force protection), which is legitimate and possibly even necessary, especially when one’s own soldiers are viewed as just combatants. Additionally, they will argue that using drones better protects civilians, lessening the danger that they will become collateral damage through the use of precise weapons technology. However right, both contentions are not sufficient for a moral assessment of the use of drones and military robotics.

The same line of argument—namely focusing on protection—is also taken by drone opponents: They point to the elimination of spatial and temporal limits in armed conflicts through the use of armed drones, the incapacitation of International Humanitarian Law (which endangers those persons legally protected), and psychological trauma among drone pilots and residents of areas monitored by drone overflight. It is also sometimes said that drones create fertile soil for more terrorism, so that, at the end of the day, instead of using them to fight terrorism, we are setting in motion a cycle of escalation. Opponents also often invoke the slippery slope leading from present-day drone technology to autonomous weapons systems.

6. Technology can be used in different ways, and drone technology can be used differently, e.g., defensively and offensively. Aristotle’s example of city fortifications does not yield an argument for armed drones since there is a crucial difference: city walls are primarily defensive. They prevent the opponent from entering one’s city, but are not themselves instruments to fight the opponent.

This distinction between defensive and offensive action is crucial. Armed drones are not fundamentally defensive. For unarmed UAVs, the situation is different; they are used for reconnaissance and thus leave open the response to perceived dangers. By means of weaponized drones, however, people are attacked with deadly force. This is the starting point for judging the use of armed drones.

7. In the following, I therefore start with the presumption that morality of war has to be based on morality of defensive force. I thereby disregard other possible justifications for the use of force (such as retribution). Defensive force is subject to strict limits. The criterion of necessity appears to be the most relevant. If defense is not necessary, it is not permitted. Necessity in this context denotes a proportionality relation: There is a sensible one-term-usage of the predicate “is necessary,” e.g., when we talk about “morally necessary” as “morally required.” But in practical situations it is rarely the case that “ψ is necessary” (ψ being an action) is a meaningful proposition. It should
read “φ is necessary for y.” (y being a state of affairs or another action). In most cases, the relationship needs to be expanded to “φ is necessary for y under the condition z.” Let us take an example: “The killing of the hostage-taker is necessary on condition that the hostage will not be wounded in an attack.” If one were prepared to risk the life of the hostage, one might risk a police action aimed at arresting the hostage-taker. Only the additional condition makes the justification of necessity valid.

In reality, there is always a wealth of such additional conditions. In the case of the hostage-taker, it certainly plays a role that he can be seen as morally responsible for the situation of threat, while the hostage must be considered innocent in the sense that she bears no responsibility for the situation. But responsibility itself is not an absolute quantity; it exists in degrees, and even the hostage-taker may be partly excused.

Proportionality is not merely the weighing of good and bad consequences of an action, but the weighing of various relations. A proportionality relation exists between two relationships. If Adam makes 30 dollars for 3 h of a certain kind of work, and Bernard makes 300 dollars for five hours of the same kind of work, whereas it seems to be fair that Bernard gets more, Bernard is being disproportionately highly paid, however (or Adam disproportionately low paid). The question of proportionality is always a question of how relations behave towards each other: x/y versus w/z. Necessity is a proportionality relationship in which one factor can be simply fixed. For example, you may know that Adam gets 30 dollars for 3 h of work and wonder how many hours is it necessary for you to get 100 dollars. It is fixed that you want to get 100 bucks.

In the same line, you may say that a threat (which may be gradual) must be completely eliminated. The extent of the threat is then no longer a variable, x, y, or z, but a constant. One problem with threats is that in reality they are no constants but highly dependent on perceptions and subjective factors. Another rather practical problem is that mostly far more than four variables are involved, which makes it even more complicated to assess proportionality and necessity. In our example, it is possible that Adam and Bernard are not actually doing exactly the same work, but that Bernard’s is somewhat more demanding (though perhaps not demanding enough to justify the much higher wage).

When we talk about necessary actions, we usually take a lot of additional factors for granted. So, I can single out only two aspects that seem to be key:

(1) Defensive use of force is generally only necessary if the threat is imminent—that is, it could not be stopped at any later point in the chain of causality. But due to their remote operation, armed drones ensure that the threat from the opponent will generally not become an imminent threat. Armed drones are means to come closer to the adversary with respect to one’s capability of attacking him or her, but they are a means of withdrawal with respect of the adversary’s capacity of attacking the user of the drone. In such cases, it is difficult to see how the use of force can be justified on the basis of legitimate self-defense, except in the case of imminent third-party defense.

(2) Killing the attacker is never necessary to repel the threat from the attacker. This point may seem sophisticated, but Thomas Aquinas correctly emphasized that killing must be the unintentional collateral consequence of defensive action (S. th. Ia IIae, q. 64, art. 3). The intended result of the act is saving the threatened good, for example, one’s own life. Targeted killings defined by the goal of killing must thus be ruled out as legitimate defensive uses of force.

This second point could even be put in an alternative way without referring to the concept of intention: If we hold that the point of self-defense is to save one’s life and not to kill the attacker, then moral praise and moral blame depend on whether one’s life is saved irrespective of whether the attacker got killed or not. But especially when self-defense is directed towards peace, the destiny of the attacker(s) is not irrelevant. “Intention” is a challenging concept, and it is impossible to illuminate it at this place. As there is an aspect of attitude in intentions, we are allowed to stress the importance of attitude in the moral assessment of action, especially actions of killing. This may permit us to point out that taking the correct attitude towards wounding and possibly killing an opponent is itself a question of virtues of character. Only preventing an evil—e.g., saving threatened lives, health, etc.—can be the incentive for defensive action, and not an intention to kill or wound.
The appetitive faculty must be oriented such that only a defensive effect—that is, repelling a threat—is aimed at, and not wounding or killing the attacker.

8. Aquinas's reflections led to the development of the problematic "doctrine of double effect," which itself cannot be discussed at this place. It is morally plausible to distinguish intended purposes from unintended ones in judging actions. For unintended consequences, we must also distinguish between those that are foreseeable at the time of the action and those that occur "unexpectedly." At times, this distinction is dismissed with the argument that it makes no difference to the victims of the defensive force whether the harm was intended, unintended or even unexpected. However, this claim seems to me to ignore most people's moral sense. It makes a difference whether somebody steps on our feet by accident or purposefully. Of course, a person killed in forceful action cannot make any claims, but in case of injury, it does make a difference to us whether we were intentionally targeted or whether the actor did not desire this outcome. Admittedly, when it comes to attitudes there is a lot of potential for error. However, generally we recognize very well the difference. Not only the actors, but also those affected by the actions or who judge the actions from the outside possess a moral sense that allows them to understand the significance of attitudes towards good behavior. Attitudes are discernible and therefore expressive in a way, which again makes them "communicative." Given our assumption that "negative" peace is not sufficient (it is concordia at best, S.Th. 1.1a 11ae, q. 29; the "peace of a church-yard," and pax requires a minimum of mutual beneficence, we have to allow for the fact that attitudes play a major role for the goal of (positive) peace.

9. This has implications for the use of technology in forceful actions. When soldiers today fully utilize their technological options, they can protect themselves almost completely. There would be no fundamental normative problem with this protection if it did not in many cases mean that other groups bear a greater burden because of the protection soldiers provide and grant themselves. As Michael Walzer has frequently stressed, based on their professional role, soldiers should take risks—though it is hard to determine how much risk this might mean in each case and context—to protect civilians from grave dangers, and they should also take certain risks in order not to expose their opponents to maximum force. ("Maximum" force can never be justified. Force has to be "narrowly" proportionate, i.e., adapted to the adversary's liability or—for those who do not accept a liability-conception of permissible harm—necessary.) Here, too, the amount is contestable for sure. From the perspective of a liability-conception, it is easiest to create ratios so that one may say that one must be willing to take more risks in fighting child soldiers than in fighting a dictator's bodyguards.

The fundamental claim for our purpose is: In normative arrays in which there is no "absolute" solution to the problem of risk distribution, virtue requires that even in situations of defense we not absolve ourselves by providing the most pleasant norm for our own selves, but that we align our normative awareness with superordinate goals, such as achieving peace. Acting in the morally required way as a soldier sometimes implies the preparedness to look a deadly risk in the eye, which is (the virtue of) bravery. The brave act itself is intrinsically valuable.

10. This virtue of bravery or fortitude gains particular importance when we take account of the aforementioned expressive and communicative aspects of virtuous behavior. Military force can only be permissible, if at all, if it can lead to conditions that no longer require the use of military force. As Aristotle explained, "War is for the sake of peace." Establishing as well as maintaining peace is a social practice. Peace cannot be reduced to military victory. Without entirely defining peace here, it may again be emphasized that self-sufficient, enduring, "positive" peace needs positive communication and communicative acts. The use of weapons can also be a communicative act. However, in most cases, the use of weapons expresses pursuit of power and aggression. Therefore, the harm caused to prospects for peace by the use of weapons must generally be judged as equally or even more serious than the harm to rights such as to life and limb brought about by the immediate destruction they cause. Sometimes, opponents do not condemn their opponents, after all, for fighting against them, but for how they fight. But there is also the chance, however small, that the use of weapons can have a peace-promoting function—not only by upholding rights, but also through the ethical obligations that an arms-bearer who fights virtuously, soldier or police officer, expresses and thus communicates.
A virtuously fighting soldier gains the respect even of his opponents—at least those fighters who are themselves value-oriented and able to recognize (however imperfectly) the inner moral standing of their adversaries. Moral beings are able to recognize other moral beings. They are able to do so, because they know about themselves. I know what it is to be honest or dishonest for me because of my (inclination to) dishonesty. In old language: My soul is in an imperfect state. "Angels"—the icons of moral excellence, but never tempted—are not virtuous.

Virtuous warfare can have a reconciliatory effect on the opponent, in the best cases. We say "in the best cases" so as not to create a misunderstanding that use of force could be an ideal way of making peace, or might in some way be an option equivalent to other methods of peacemaking. On the contrary, the risk that use of force will further harden positions and worsen conflict is enormous. It is only to say that when war cannot be avoided (and by far most wars can be avoided), it should at least be fought in a virtuous way. Cicero was thus right to generally rank civil over military virtues, and William James was also right to insist that human beings' conflict-oriented efforts should be sublimated—to use an expression from psychoanalysis—into peaceful ambitions. We should certainly not neglect the fact that in the end very often different concepts of positive peace are the very reason for warfare. It is easier to agree on the features of negative peace: absence of physical violence, or satisfaction of some vital needs. It is much harder to agree on the features of positive peace like a common legal framework and shared values.

11. We should approach our reflections from the other end as well: Without virtue in warfare, the prospects for peace are all the more likely to be frustrated by conflict. These reflections may be linked to the significance of "exempla" (as emphasized by Cicero) in practical philosophy and ethics: One who acts in a certain way is not only following a fundamental norm, but also demonstrating that he accepts as "true" the rationality model supporting the norm. This acceptance-assertion proves its worth or stands its test in the mutual support between rational considerations and implementation that remains faithful to the norm. However, this "pragmatic" consideration, which is of great significance for pacifists in particular, shows itself to be generally important, including for soldiers. Acting in conformity with norms constitutes not only a statement about one's own compliance, but also an invitation: "Look, this behavior proves its worth because the rationality model proves its coherence through it." Virtuous behavior is based on a more complex moral psychology than simply an image of human beings as norm-following automatons, taking into account their rational capacity as well as their appetitive faculties, and proves its worth in regard to a more coherent overall image of human coexistence.

12. A philosophical concept of positive peace must be formed by way of philosophical anthropology and dialogue, i.e., communication. Killing civilians as a punishment for guerilla warfare is communication as well. Responding to these killings by killing prisoners of warfare is among other things—a communicative act. Killing and counter-killing may come up to a destructive "dialogue." Fortunately, there is constructive dialogue as well. Treating prisoners well, or renouncing revenge, can be virtuous in a communicative act. Even the use of technological instruments naturally improves prospects for victory, in the sense of overpowering the adversary, but it does not improve the prospects for a lasting "positive" peace. The use of technology bears within it an element of withdrawal. This withdrawal is all but total in the case of remote-controlled robotic weaponry. Nevertheless, the communicative effect of this withdrawal is to convey that the goals of military action are not worth risking life and limb.

Here, too, we must guard against misunderstanding: The issue here is not exposing soldiers willfully to increased risk—not even when one is aware that ethical virtues require practice and familiarity in order to be learned. But properly understood, it is in the interests of soldiers themselves (as promoters of peace) to be allowed to be expressive in their actions. Expression is only expression if it is perceptible. Metaphorically spoken: Military robotics does not recognize the individuals they attack as human beings. We might say that robots "see" their opponents only as machines, not as morally capable actors. We might even say (applying anthropomorphism again): Military robots perceive not only the opponent as a machine, but also their own operators. Usage of military
robotics is prone to “degrade” the users as well as those who are attacked by it.\textsuperscript{47} We see this today in the use of armed drones. They can collect such large amounts of intelligence data that no single person can process it. Data processing itself is left to machines. Then, however, human operators have no other choice but to follow the machine’s suggestions in making decisions. As a result of this incapacitation, we surmise, in the long or short run, operators will neither be “in the loop” or “on the loop,” but will withdraw completely from the intelligence-effect relationship.

13. Virtues are not something added to human behavior as a pleasant and desirable addendum. In our interpretation, they are necessary as dianoetic virtues for recognizing the morally required action, and as ethical virtues they are necessary to the willingness to follow a norm even if virtuous behavior seems to place burdens upon the addressees of a moral requirement. Virtues are not skills, but—perceived from the outside—they are the expression of a person’s moral character. One who reveals himself morally in a certain way will challenge others to respond to him or her morally. One who deceives will lose trust. One who intentionally applies force but simultaneously distances him- or herself from his or her act of force will not be able to convey that he really cares about the goals of the force. Thus even for purely utilitarian reasons, it makes sense to insist on military virtues. Utilitarians need a goal to relate actions to it. If the goal cannot be thought of without virtues—as is the case with “positive” peace among human beings—then virtues are essential in actions leading to the goal. But utilitarian considerations hardly exhaust the significance of virtues—especially not in the case of armed force, which is one of the most serious ways human beings interact with each other.

Unfortunately, however, the question of peace is often avoided in the debate on just war. Most current debates about \textit{ius in bello} thus attempt to avoid any moral-psychological or anthropological references. Often, there are concepts of the human being that inform the deeper dimensions of conflict. Based on the possible plurality of concepts of the human being, there will probably always be conflicts, especially between religious interpretations of man and those who reject that dimension. But overcoming this plurality and accessing it through mutual explanation and listening requires a great deal of virtue. Neither war nor peace can manage without virtues.

Notes

1. Virtues are not simply attitudes, which are factual, but rather dispositions to certain actions. A strictly Cartesian dualism of “inner” mind and “outer” physical reality is rejected in this paper.
2. Nonetheless, I do not intend to offer a virtue-ethics-account in the sense that virtues and character traits are axiologically superior to good actions. In this sense, my approach is “virtue theory” rather than “virtue ethics” (cf. Hursthouse 2013), but I do not think that virtues are “nice to have.” They are indispensable for a full depiction of our moral reality.
3. Think only about Niccolò Machiavelli’s concept of “virtù,” which is a more technical skill for maintenance of power.
5. We can think about the digestive system, which can be in better or worse condition. But the virtue of the digestive system is ethically irrelevant. The term that is usually translated with “virtue” (Cicero’s translation is \textit{virtus}) is not only used in the moral sense. Initially it only means that something is in a good condition.
10. For the concept of \textit{phronesis} cf. Schröer (2016), esp. 51/2.
12. This shows clearly that virtues are not simply skills. One might be able to play the violin but not be motivated to do so. But one cannot be virtuous in an action that requires virtue without actually showing virtue. Cf. Müller (2018), and Müller (2011), esp. 2250. Referring to the importance of virtue for the motivation of an action actually means referring to a modified conception of virtue than Aristotle’s, which comes closer to the Stoic conception with its primacy of the norm. Cf. again Schröer (2016), 52–56.
19. I leave out other important aspects like procurement and design of weapons.
20. This is the standard argument in favour of armed drones in Germany. The acquisition of armed drones is for bridging a "protection gap." A parliamentary statement of the German minister of defence is available at Manthey (2014).
22. Against this are the arguments by Patrick B. Johnston and Anoop K. Sarabhai (2016) that terroristic activities could at least be reduced by the use of drones on a short- and mid-term level.
23. But even consequentialist opponents of autonomous weapon systems can hardly explain just why these instruments have to be excluded. Good objectives could also be reached through the use.
24. One has to think separately about the destruction of objects (especially where protected objects of cultural value are concerned), but the following arguments relate to the killing of human beings. In addition, the question of "pure" surveillance drones is relevant on an ethical level. Surveillance is usually connected to a regime of control.
25. One may rightly question whether one should not speak of "law upholding violence" since the question of what can be an object of legitimate defence first has to be solved through the law: Is there an original possession of one's own body or one's own life or does there have to be a social construction of a right to possession? This is not the place to discuss this difficulty. What has to be said here, though, is that in the debate between the "traditional account" and the "revisionist account" of just war thinking, I follow the "revisionists" in so far that they oppose a moral special area for military violence.
26. Jeff McMahan (2014, 2) argues that "the difference between necessity and proportionality is in the different comparisons they require. The determination of whether an act of defence is necessary as a means of avoiding a threatened harm requires comparisons between is expected consequences and those of alternative means of achieving the same defensive aim. ... Whereas necessity requires comparisons between an act of defence and alternative means of avoiding a threatened harm, proportionality requires a comparison between an act of defence and doing nothing to prevent the threatened harm." But "doing nothing" could be the "alternative means." It may not prevent the threatened harm, but it may prevent much harm that come with "necessary" defence. Necessity takes it as given that the threatened harm has to be prevented. So it eliminates one variable in the proportionality calculus but it is still a type of proportionality.
27. In semantic or ontological contexts "x is necessary" might be sustainable as well.
28. The question of what is understood by "immediacy" goes back to the Middle Ages: Raymond of Penafort (died 1275) and his commentator William of Rennes discussed it under the term "in continenti": "For by law it is permitted for anyone to repel force with force, immediately (in continenti) and with the moderation of blameless defense" (Summa Raymundi, cited in Reichberg et al. 2006, 139).
32. I am grateful to Florian Demont for this point (among many other important hints).
33. A doctrine takes on the status of a quasi-legal norm, and thus even in the ex-ante considerations of the actors, a standard is applied that cannot be easily overturned or overruled by an ex-post judgment.
34. Consequences that are foreseeable but have not been foreseen because of negligence while investigating do not count as unexpected consequences in this sense.
35. I find this notion of "expressive-ness" in Brian Orend's depiction of Kant's ideas about *ius in bello*. Orend thinks that for Kant "jus in bello rules are not just 'external', but 'internal', too." This rule "is expressive of any kind of internal moral corruption" (Orend 2015, 139).
36. Friedrich Schiller: Don Carlos, Act III, Scene X. Taken from: Follen (1837, 92).
37. For example, Thomas More a mastermind of targeted killing—proposes that the Utopians encourage sedition within the enemy in order to escape fighting themselves. If sedition does not work, Utopians
should rely on mercenaries, especially the Zappoletes (Utopia, bk. 2; cf. Reichberg et al. 2006, 262–263). But if they do have to fight, “their courage is proud and contemptuous of defeat.”

38. Politics, book VII, 14, 1333a35; own translation, BK.
39. For a modern approach on the distinction between “positive” and “negative” peace cf. Galtung (2012).
40. A moral character requires (among other things) “the ability, to comprehend the ‘inner life’ of others, both on the intellectual and the emotional level” (Frankena 1963).
41. However a central assumption for my case, I am unable to explain this thesis here.
42. Some people may object that virtues are related to specific cultures and therefore unable to be the basis of understanding in wars. Conceded, there may be cases where the interpretation of values differs in this extreme way. But in most cases it does not. Cf. Nussbaum (1993).
43. Cicero (1913).
47. In this lies also the calamity with robots, which are supposed to take care of persons in need of care. They only meet the other person superficially like a human caretaker. But the inner cavity is still felt by the patients. And even if the robot was that perfect that this would not be felt, this would mean just the more an absement for the patient.

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Is Cyberpeace Possible?

Markus Christen and Endre Bangerter

Introduction

In the literature on cyberwar, one finds titles like “Cyber War Will Take Place!” or “The Myth of Cyberwar.” They are exemplars of a heated debate about a new battlefield enabled by information and communication technology (ICT). This debate is controversial and authors regularly note a lack of precision in key terminology. In addition, it involves powerful stakeholders and substantial financial interests from state actors like the military or companies active in ICT. The key observation is, however, that the debate on cyberwar is pushed by the transformational forces of the digitalization of society, creating both new opportunities and vulnerabilities. The notion